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Chapter 1 
 
Demand 
 
1.1 Size and structure of Demand 
 
In 2005, The entire medical expenditure in China was 759 billion RMB (US$99 billion), 
which was about one third of Japan’s expenditure, 3.24 trillion JPY (US$270 billion). 
The population of Japan is around 0.12 billion, which is about one tenth of the Chinese 
population. China’s per capita medical expenditure, therefore, is almost one thirtieth of 
Japan’s. 
 
Table 1 presents figures related to the size of medical expenditure. Indexes for health 
achievement reveal that China has seen relatively good performance as a developing 
economy: life expectancy is almost ten years less than Japan and the US, but it is at 
almost the same level as Thailand. Infant mortality substantially decreased from 34.7‰ 
in 1981 to 28.4‰. The proportion of the population aged 65 or above is smaller than 
Japan and the US, but it is expected to grow faster. However, China is still distant from 
Japan or the US in terms of these indexes. Coincidently, China’s medical expenditure is 
smaller that these countries in terms of ratio to GNP, per capita expense or medical 
expenses among the whole fiscal expenditure. On the other hand, China’s share of drug 
expenditure among total medical expenditure (52%) is much higher than Japan (20%) 
and the US (11%). 
 
The burden on the individual to share in medical expenditure is much larger than in the 
two developed economies. The Chinese government sectors only bears 17% of the cost, 
while the Japanese government and compulsory medical insurance cover 85% of 
medical fees. About half the population is not medically insured. 
 
Table 1: Medical Expenditures of China, Japan and the US 
 
 China Japan US 
Health Achievement    
Life Expectancy  
Male: 69.63 
Female: 76.33 
(2000) 
Male: 78.53 
Female: 85.59 
(2005) 
Male: 74.8 
Female: 80.1 
(2003) 
    
Infant Mortality  19.0‰ 3.0‰ 6.9‰ 
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(2000) (2002)  (2001) 
    
Proportion of the Population 
aged 65 above  
7.7% 
(2005) 
19.6%  
(2005) 
12.3% 
(2005) 
(Source) China: China Health Statistical Yearbook 2005 and Ministry of Labor and Social 
Service Insurance. Japan: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare website. 
 
Table 2: Medical Expenditures of China, Japan and the US (2005) 
 
 China  Japan  USA 
Expenditure     
Total Medical Expenditure  865.99 bil RMB (US$108 bil) 
3.24 tril. JPY 
(US$270 bil) US$600 bil 
TME /GDP 4.73% 8.6% 14% 
Medical Fiscal Expenditure/ 
Total Fiscal Expenditure 1.77% 10%  35% 
Drug Expense/ Total Medical 
Expenditure 52 % 20% 11% 
Per Capita Medical Expense 
(2003) 
Urban1108.9 RMB 
(US$139) 
Rural 274.7 RMB 
(US$34) 
US$2,450 
 
US$4,090 
 
Inpatient Per Capita Fee  
4668.9 RMB 
(1992.0RMB) 
  
Outpatient Per Capita Fee 128.9 RMB (65.oRMB)   
Burden sharing    
Distribution by Agents 
Government   17% 
Society       29% 
Individual     54% 
Governments 33% 
National Health 
Insurance 52% 
Individual 15% 
 
Public Medical Insurance 
Coverage 50% of nation Almost all the nation  
Ratio of Individual 
Disbursement 
Urban 45% 
Rural 79% 30%  
(Source) The industrial map of China Pharmaceuticals 2006-07, Social Sciences Academic 
Press. 
 
 
1.2 OTC Drugs and Prescriptions 
 
The channels for drugs sales are prescriptions at hospital and OTC (Over the Counter) 
drugs. For OTC sales, the State Drug Administration has continuously announced sine 
1999 the “Catalogue of OTC Drugs” to be registered, with distinct control over 
prescription drugs, which are drugs registered under the “Drug Registration 
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Management Law.” OTC drugs are required to be sold to patients by pharmacist over 
the counter.  However, as Table 3 shows, the number of pharmacists is far smaller, 
almost one third of the number of physicians, thus in practice they are sold in the same 
way as an ordinary commodity at supermarkets. 
 
The proportion of prescription drugs is around 70% of total pharmaceutical sales in 
China, and OTC takes up around 30% (Interview with Chemical Drug Manufacture’s 
Association in November 2006), although the latter has been steadily increasing over 
these years. Thus, for most pharmaceutical firms in China, physicians in hospitals are 
the buyers who have right to decide whether the hospital orders a particular drug, and 
they prescribe the drugs as an agent of the patient.  
 
Table 3: Sales Routes for Drugs 
 
 Prescription OTC  
Sales Route Manufacture → Wholesaler →
Hospital 
Manufacture → Wholesaler →
Drug Store 
Who 
Prescribes? 
Physicians Pharmacists 
 # of Physicians  1,555,658 (2005)
#of Hospital       65,000 (2005)
# of Pharmacists 349,533 (2005)
 
Who Pays? Medical insurance/ patients Patient 
# of Drugs 3, 214*1 4,279 (2005) 
Sales Volume 150.4 billion RMB (2005) 78.2 billion RMB (2005) 
(Source) Ministry of Health website. Japan, Wikipedia, Medicine (China). Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Information on China’s pharmaceuticals 
(in Japanese). 
(Note) *1: number of drugs on the China Pharmaceutical Catalogue. 
 
 
1.3 Medical Insurance Plans and Their Drug Catalogues 
 
There are two classifications of ultimate drug purchasers: the medical insurers and 
patients. Currently, there coexists about 7 types of medical insurance plans, but around 
50% of population is not insured (Table 4). 
 
In 1997, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council 
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announced the “Decision on Health Sector Reform and Development,” and the Urban 
Employee Basic Medical Insurance (城市基本医疗保险: UEBMI), or the National 
Basic Medical Insurance, was launched by the State Council in 1998. This is the 
country’s compulsory medical insurance plan but it has not yet been legislated, even in 
2007, and its coverage is still limited as corporations are reluctant to pay the premiums. 
However, the UEBMI is currently the largest medical insurance plan in China, although 
it covers only 30% of the urban population (or less than 10% of the total population). 
Big Disease Medical Insurance complements those insured under the UEBMI, covering 
expensive medical services. For the urban population, there used to be two medical 
insurance plans: the Public Expense Medical Insurance (公费医疗保险) and Labor 
Medical Insurance (劳保医疗保险), both established in 1951. The former is disbursed 
by the local government’s fiscal budget, while the latter is disbursed by the corporations, 
or State Owned Enterprises. Both cover 100% of medical fees for the insured and a 
proportion of the fees for their families. After of the UEBMI was set up in 1998, these 
two insurance plans are intended to gradually transition to the UEBMI. 
 
In rural areas, cooperative medical insurance plans were set up in the 1940s 
accompanying the People’s Commune (人民公社), but that decayed in the 1980s. The 
State Council announced the “Decision on Strengthening the Health Care System in 
Rural Areas,” in 2002, and the “Announcement on the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
System.”  By the end of 2006, 0.508 billion people in the 1451 counties joined the 
insurance plan. In 2006, the participation ratio was 80%, although it was on a voluntary 
basis, and the insurance plan reimbursed 15.581 billion RMB. Currently, these 3 types, 
UEBMI, the Public Expense Medical Insurance and the Rural Cooperative Medical 
Insurance are the main insurance plans that cover the population in China. 
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Table 4: Medical Insurance Plans and Their Coverage (2004) 
 
    Total Urban Rural 
  Target  Burden Sharing 100 100 100 
1 Urban employee basic medical insurance Compulsory for current and retired 
workers in urban areas.  
Corporation pays 6% of total wage 
and individual pays 2% of own wage 
A list: insurance pays 100%  
B list: individual also pays a fixed 
ratio (fixed by the local governments.)
8.9 30.4 1.5 
2 Major disease insurance  Insured b 1. Corporation and employee (different 
amounts according to administration.)
0.6 1.8 0.1 
3 Labor medical insurance Employees, retired staff of SOEs 
and their family (Transition to 1.) 
Corporation (100%) 1.3 4.6 0.1 
4 Public expense medical insurance  Public servants, party leaders and 
cadets (Transition to 1.)   
Local Fiscal (100%)  1.2 4 0.2 
5 Rural cooperative medical insurance Revived in 2002. Individual (10 yuan), central and local 
fiscals (20 yuan respectively.) 
8.8 6.6 9.5 
6 Other social medical insurance 1) Labor injury insurance 
2) Urban welfare medical 
assistance 
3) Maternity medical insurance 
 
1) Corporation pays 0.5%, 1% and 
2% of wages. 
2) Local fiscal: Deducts 20 –30 % of 
medical expenses. 
3) Corporation pays 1% or below of 
female worker. 
1.4 2.2 1.2 
7 Commercial medical insurance Individuals purchase insurance.  7.6 5.6 8.3 
8 Not insured   70.3 44.8 79.0 
(Source) China Health Statistics Yearbook 2005 
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These parallel medical insurance systems provide parallel drug catalogues, which leads 
to a complicated demand structure for drugs in China. In China, there are three basic 
drug catalogues: the China Pharmacopoeia, the State Basic Drug Catalogue (issued by 
the State Food and Drug Administration) and the SFDA Import Drug Catalogue. 
UEBMI complies an insurance redemption list consisting of 1,031 chemical drugs and 
832 Traditional Chinese Medicines (2004 version). Rural cooperative insurances or the 
urban community also compile their own drug catalogues.  Practically, from the point 
of pharmaceutical firms, the insurance redemption list of UEBMI is the most important 
drug catalogue. 
 
Table 5: Drug Catalogues 
 
 By  Insurance  # of Drugs 
Basic Drug Catalogues     
China Pharmacopoeia Pharmacopoeia 
committee 
- 3,214 
State Basic Drugs Catalogue SFDA - CD773, 
TCM1260   
SFDA Import Drugs Catalogue SFDA -  
Insurance Reimbursement Catalogues    
State Basic Medical Insurance Drug Catalogue MLSS 1. CD1031, 
TCM832 
A list: basic, generic drugs MLSS 1. CD 315 TCM 135
        B list: optional, new drugs MLSS 2.3. CD 712 TCM 688
Rural Cooperative Insurance Drugs Catalogue MOA 5.  
Urban Community Drug Catalogue  -   
Important Base Drug Catalogue -   
(Source) State basic drugs list, State Food Drug Administration. State Basic Medical Insurance 
Drug Catalogue, Ministry of Labor, Social Securities. Wikipedia, Medicine (China), Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Information on China’s pharmaceuticals (in 
Japanese). 
(Note) CD=chemical drugs, TCM= traditional Chinese medicine, SFDA=State Food and 
Drug Administration, MLSS=Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
 
In Figure 1, we draw a rough flow of the drug demand to see who purchases how many 
of the drugs in China. Though there is no exact data for this, we estimated the ratio of 
burden sharing by the medical insurance and the patients as follows: OTC drugs, whose 
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share of the drug market is 30% as we already saw in Section 1.2, is 100% self paid by 
patient. The share of individual payment in this drug market is 0.3*1=30%. The 
payment of prescription drugs, which takes up a 70% share of the market, is covered by 
the insurance reimbursement and payment by the patients themselves. The medical 
insurance covers 50% of population, that is 50% of prescription drugs. Furthermore the 
insurance reimbursement ratio is less than 100%, but we have no exact data - we have 
assumed here 80%. Thus, medical insurance purchases 0.7*0.5*0.8=30% of total drug 
sales. The remainder of the prescription drug costs are borne by the patients themselves. 
 
Here we can see that roughly 70% of drug sales are reimbursed out of the patient’s own 
wallet. The coverage by the medical insurance plans is far less than half of the drug 
sales, around only 30%. As already pointed out universally in China, the limited 
coverage of medical insurance plans is the main reason why the general public 
complains that hospital services are far beyond their ability to afford. 
 
Figure 1: Who Purchases How Many Drugs in China? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
30% 
 
 
 
40%
Patient 
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Medical Insurances Plan
Prescriptions on 
the catalogues 
Prescription drugs 
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30% 
OTC 
(Source) Author 
(Note) Figures in three pillars are sales ratios estimated by the author. The formula for 
estimation is stated in the text.   
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1.4 “Feeding Hospital by Drugs (以药养医 )”: The Hospital’s 
Demand 
 
The demand for drug in China is characterized by the following natures. 1) The ultimate 
purchasers of the drugs are the medical insurers and individuals, where the former 
covers about 50% of the population at most. 2) The direct purchasers of the drugs for 
manufacturers are primarily hospitals. Hospitals and physicians are expected to act as 
patients’ agents. However, hospitals in China have the following problems: 1) though 
there is strong demand for better medical services, the utilization rate of medical 
services remains low because hospital charges are beyond the affordability of the 
general public. 2) The hospitals’ revenue structure largely depends on the revenue 
earned from dispensing drugs. General hospitals and traditional Chinese hospitals both 
depend on drugs for more than 40% of their revenue. Historical development shows that 
the dispensing of drugs has accounted for 40-50% since 1998 to 2005 while, in the same 
timeframe, the revenue share from medical consultation fees is increasing slightly but 
steadily (Tables 6 and 7). 
 
Table 6: Revenue Structure by Hospital Type (2004) 
 
 Total General 
Hospitals
Traditional 
Chinese 
Hospitals
Specialized 
Hospitals 
Maternal 
and Child 
Health 
Stations
# of hospitals 9583 5704 2290 1323 1482 
  
Hospital total revenue (average) 34,851 45,465 16,519 24,939 8,283
Subsidy  4,460 5,861 1,656 3,858 1,225
Medical consultation fee 15,553 20,463 6,813 11,432 4,441
Drug dispensing revenue 14,059 18,166 7,597 9,073 2,400
  
Hospital total revenue (average) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Subsidy  13% 13% 10% 15% 15%
Medical consultation fee 45% 45% 41% 46% 54%
Drug dispensing revenue 40% 40% 46% 36% 29%
(Source) China Health Statistical Yearbook 2005. 
 
Table 7: Historical Change in Revenue Structure (General Hospitals) 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
# of hospitals 4052 4072 4088 4112 4488 4779 4848  
    
Amount (000 RMB)    
Total revenue  25,947 28,583 32,424 35,379 37,151 39,694 51,118  
Subsidy  1,554 1,946 2,041 2,516 2,730 2,974 3,182  
Medical Consultation Fee 9,909 12,502 14,131 15,623 16,841 18,277 22,960  
Drug Dispensing Revenue 11,991 13,373 15,006 16,026 16,162 17,338 20,457  
         
Share (%)         
Total revenue (average) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Subsidy  6.0% 6.8% 6.3% 7.1% 7.3% 7.5% 6.2% 5.0%
Medical Consultation Fee 38.2% 43.7% 43.6% 44.2% 45.3% 46.0% 44.9% 47.0%
Drug Dispensing Revenue 46.2% 46.8% 46.3% 45.3% 43.5% 43.7% 40.0% 48.0%
(Source) 1998-2004: China Health Statistical Yearbook 2005. 2005: The industrial map of 
China Pharmaceuticals 2006-07, Social Sciences Academic Press. 
 
What is behind this high dependence on drugs? It is commonly perceived that as the 
drug price margin between sales to the patient and procurement from the manufactures 
goes to the hospital, the hospital and physician have a strong preference to prescribe 
more expensive drugs. In our interviews with the management of pharmaceutical firms 
that also run private hospitals, it was confirmed “no hospital can afford to operate 
without depending on the drug margins” (interview in June 2007). Hosptials’ high 
dependency on price margins is often attributed to poor support by the fiscals. As we 
can see in Table 7, that subsidy from the government is only limited to 5-7%. This poor 
support by the public sector is attributed to fiscal decentralization due to the central 
government’s huge deficit during the reform period since 1978. 
 
Uchimura and Jutting [2007] analyzed that infant mortality rates are lower when a 
county has larger revenues compared to when transferring from a provincial 
government, based on a panel data set with nation-wide county-level data. For those 
local governments that have only limited revenues, their ability to spend on local public 
goods such as healthcare depends crucially upon inter-governmental transfers. But it is 
implied that the transfer is not enough to equalize the health outcome among counties. 
 
Hospitals should respond to maximize their revenue by enlarging the drug price margins. 
Meng [2006] conducted a detailed data collection on the impact of the medical reform 
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on medical service demand. A study on the introduction of price regulations on drugs in 
2000 found that the hospitals prescribed new drugs on the price regulation, with prices 
being two times higher than pre-reform. This result suggests a preference on the part of 
hospitals toward higher priced drugs, which is the opposite of the response towards 
normal goods. 
 
In 2007, the Chinese government has taken some steps to reform this problem: (1) 
Nanjing is testing the separation of hospitals and pharmacies. It is expected that 
hospitals will not set high prices by separating their income from drug revenue. This has 
been effective in Japan since around 2000. However, it is reported that in Nanjing 
management and ownership of pharmacies has been separated, and management has 
been given over to drug trading companies, whereas ownership still belongs with the 
hospital. As there no new revenues were arranged for hospitals, they consequently still 
need to  rely on the drug margin, requiring the drug trading companies to pay back a 
margin for drug sales. The margin ratio is reported to be 36-45 % (Zhao and Zhao 
[2006]). Thus the separation of the management and ownership of pharmacies does not 
seem to be effective at reducing drug prices. (2) Beijing Community Hospital Medical 
Reform: since 2007, the Beijing City Government has started to reimburse all the drug 
fees for 16 basic diagnoses at community health stations. This reform is targeted not 
only at reducing the general public’s expenditure, but also at encouraging patients with 
mild diseases to go to the community health stations rather than the main hospitals that 
have are already above capacity.  
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